at AdaCore located in Paris, France. AdaCore is a company providing commercial software solutions for Ada, a language targeting safety-critical applications. More specifically, SPARK Pro [1, 2, 12 ] is a static analysis tool-suite using formal methods to deductively verify a subset of Ada (called SPARK), commercialized in partnership with Altran. The tool can be used to meet DO-178B/C (and the Formal Methods supplement DO-333), CENELEC 50128, IEC 61508, and DEFSTAN 00-56 standards. Its latest revision is called SPARK 2014.
Your contribution
The main scientific contributions of this report are the following: the design of rules for access types in SPARK, inspired by Rust's borrow-checker and affine typing, enforcing Concurrent Read, Exclusive Write (CREW ) and an intra-procedural move semantics. We also present an implementation in Ada's compiler (called GNAT ) front-end as a static analysis pass. Then we formalize these rules on a subset of SPARK and give a proof of non-aliasing, as done for a subset of Rust in [14] and [15] . Finally, we study these new rules on existing code-base and examples, in order to check for their applicability for real software, and compare them to Rust on some idiomatic constructs.
Arguments supporting its validity
The rules established by the author were validated at several levels. The Language Design Committee of Ada/SPARK, an international board of experts in Ada, validated the rules as a standard feature for a future version of SPARK (most likely SPARK Pro 19). Comparison with Rust showed a great improvement on aliasing control at the expense of not handling automatic reclamation and non-null pointer coercion, being both checked by other passes in SPARK Pro.
Tests on industrial Ada code containing pointers (Ada drivers library, big strings containers library) showed that this analysis only requires minor changes to the code in order for it to be accepted in SPARK Pro.
Summary and future work
First future step would consist in extending SPARK tool-chain to have its flow analysis and proof mechanisms compatible with the new pointers added. Indeed, during the internship, only the anti-aliasing rules have been implemented, whereas the remaining part of the SPARK back-end needs modifications to analyze SPARK code containing pointers. For this purpose, a post-doc has been hired by AdaCore to work on those issues.
Next steps would consist in finalizing the implementation on corner-cases of SPARK, and presenting the results at an international scientific conference. A more general adoption of those rules by different customers as well as the generalization of non-aliasing proofs to the complete SPARK language is expected. A good evolution could also be to formalize those proofs in an interactive theorem prover (such as Coq or Isabelle) in order to have stronger guarantees on the system. This internship gives us a better understanding of borrow-checkers and the kind of guarantees they should give, not only theoretically (formalization of what is a borrow-checker, proof of soundness), but also in practice (what a borrow-checker should exactly take care of, how to make it understandable to users, how to integrate it with other tools for static analysis). A lot of features are unique to Ada amongst programming languages for safety-critical applications, in particular modes of parameters, that can be of mode in, out or in-out. 3 An in parameter can be read but not modified by the callee whereas an in-out parameter can be read and modified, and out parameters can only be modified (and are considered uninitialized), their values being sent back to the caller.
The language has many features inherited from older versions, and its safety concerns require it to have a well-defined semantics detailed in the Ada Reference Manual [4] .
SPARK 2014
SPARK 2014 is a subset of Ada designed and suited for static analysis using formal methods. SPARK 2014 features specification constructs allowing writing pre and post conditions, assertions, invariants, data dependencies. A SPARK program is either made of fully written SPARK code, or is a subset of an Ada program where some subprograms or packages have been marked with a special annotation called SPARK Mode, which allows mixing SPARK and non-SPARK code.
The main restrictions with respect to full Ada are the absence of pointers and aliasing (some checks are already done in SPARK to prevent aliasing between parameters and globals) and concurrency handling (only extended Ravenscar profile [9] is allowed). We also require that objects must fulfill the Liskov Substitution Principle (LSP) [10] , which prevents a more specialized subclass to have its invariants violated by the methods of the parent class. More specifically this forces the more specialized subclass to implement subbehaviors of the parent class with respect to contracts expressed on the parent methods.
In this report, we study a small subset of SPARK enriched with pointers, called µSPARK, the grammar of which is given in Appendix B. Each µSPARK program consists of a single file that contains a main procedure. Each procedure starts with a list of definitions (type, procedure or variable) followed by a body. This body is a sequence of statements, typically assignments, allocations, procedure calls, conditional statements. We abstract out the condition of the if statement, considering it as a non-deterministic branching.
Proofs in presence of aliasing
To illustrate how aliasing can cause problems with proofs, let us consider the following function with two parameters, that increases each of them. The contract that could be expected of such a function (written in C annotated with ACSL contracts [13] ), ensures that the two parameters have their value increased by one at the end of the function. /* @ requires \ valid ( x ) && \ valid ( y ); ensures (* x == \ old (* x )+1 && * y == \ old (* y )+1 ); */ void inc ( int * x , int * y ) { * x ++; * y ++; } This contract is false in presence of aliasing. Indeed if x and y point to the same variable, then the final value of each parameter would get increased by two instead of one. In ACSL, it is possible to use a logic function to express separation of sets of pointers by adding annotations specifying that two pointers should be considered as non-aliased. The contract hence becomes as following, which gets easily proved using the WP or Jessie plug-in of Frama-C toolset /* @ requires \ valid ( x ) && \ valid ( y ); requires \ separated (x , y ); ensures (* x == \ old (* x )+1 && * y == \ old (* y )+1 ); */
Rust
Rust is a new programming language created by Mozilla Foundation [11] and intended for system programming. It focuses mainly on memory safety, with the help of a powerful mechanism called a borrow-checker, that prevents non-safe aliasing through pointer analysis with techniques inspired by affine types (in which resources can be used at most once) [8, 17] .
The borrow-checker analyzes the source code looking for two different constructs: moves and borrows.
Moves happen at the right-hand side of assignments as well as when passing parameters to functions that are not borrowed (see after). Resources that are moved are consumed (exactly as in affine types), which allows only a single path to read or modify resources at a time.
Borrows are temporary grants of a given resource to another path, that can be either immutable (readonly, using the symbol &) or mutable (read-write, using the symbol &mut). The borrow checker verifies that when grants are given, the CREW principle is respected, raising errors at each violation. As an example, let us consider the following code which borrows mutably twice the same path, triggering an error. Rust's borrow-checker also checks the lifetimes of pointers to make sure that no dangling pointer is used, and to provide a compile-time garbage collector.
Main objective
The goal of this internship is to design a mechanism that controls aliasing in SPARK, based on enforcing CREW. We use a model in which a syntactical element has (full or partial) ownership of all data that is accessible from it (e.g. a pointer owns the data pointed by it, ...).
The CREW mechanism must ensure that two aliased paths do not have full ownership of the underlying data. More specifically, either one path has the full ownership (read-write) and the others have no ownership at all, or all of them have at most partial ownership (read-only).
Access types in µSPARK
Three mechanisms have been created to ensure aliasing control, named respectively move, borrow and observe. The first one consists in checking assignments, whereas the two others focus on subprogram calls. We present the aliasing rules for µSPARK, while explaining the main differences when passing to complete SPARK in section 4.2.
Definitions
We define paths as abstractions of left values (called names in Ada). More precisely, a path is a name in which all array indices have been abstracted and all dereferences (or equivalently indirections) are made explicit. 4 In the case of µSPARK, names and paths are the same, given that implicit dereference as well as arrays are excluded from the language. Note that in Ada, dereferences are written using the .all selector.
By introducing the notion of prefixes and extensions of paths, we can use trees to represent a set of paths, as shown in Figure 1 . This tree is defined as the following. Each node represents a path, with the root being the base identifier. Those We will focus our analysis on types that can cause aliasing problems during assignment or parameter passing, that we call deep, that are intuitively pointers and records having at least one deep type component. Formally, a type is said to be deep if it is a type having an access part. 5 Types that are not deep are called shallow.
Reading and writing a path
Let us consider a path (example My Var.all). Our memory model gives to this path the ownership of all its extensions (hence all the subtree that is rooted at My Var.all). This asymmetry is fundamental when considering the rules for non-aliasing. Reading follows the pointers underlying a data structure whereas writing is stopped at those pointers, that get smashed instead. To explicitly control aliasing, we must restrict the readability and writability of some paths to ensure that only one path can write a given memory area at a time. For this, we add explicitly permissions on the previous trees, that can be of four different values: RW (read-write), W (write-only), R (read-only), NO (no permission). Those permissions form a lattice, whose Hasse diagram is given in Figure 2 .
Permissions
Those trees enriched with permissions are called permission trees, and their formal definition is given is Appendix E. Note that those trees are of infinite depth when a structure has a component of type access to itself (linked lists, graphs, ...).
Moving
Moving is a mechanism that transfers ownership from one or more paths (called the moved paths, the right-hand side) to another path (the assigned path, the left-hand side).
In order to find all the paths present in the right-hand side that are considered as moved, we first define the concept of moved expression, and then gather from those expressions every path on which we check the adequate permissions and update them accordingly. Finally, we update the permission of the assigned path.
More formally, an expression appearing in the right-hand side of an assignment statement is a moved expression when:
• It is a deep type top-level expression (i.e. expressions that are not part of other expressions).
• It is the prefix of an Access attribute (equivalent to & "address-of" unary operator in C) of a moved expression. 6
• It is a deep type direct sub-expression of a moved expression.
When a moved expression is a name, then this yields directly a moved path. We process each moved path sequentially by checking first its Read-Write permission, and then deleting both read and write permission to any path that gets aliased with the assigned path. Using our tree representation, one could remark that when a path (ie. node) is aliased, then all the subtree rooted at that node is also aliased. Hence we can directly consider aliases of trees. If the path is yielded from the prefix of an Access attribute, then the whole subtree is aliased. Hence, the whole subtree sees its permission changed to NO, as well as any ancestor node (prefix) of this path that have the same number of indirections. All other ancestors only lose their readability and get their permission updated to W. 7 In the other case, any subtree that has more indirections than the moved path is aliased. Hence those subtrees have their permission changed to NO, while all other nodes of the moved tree only lose their readability. Similarly, all ancestors have their permission set to W. 8 Finally, the assigned path is checked to have either W or RW permission. The assigned path and any of its extensions get RW permission. We then propagate this update to prefixes by increasing their permission with the greatest lower bound of the permissions of their descendants. More details on this propagation are given in Appendix E, which defines the PermRelease operator.
Borrowing
Borrowing consists in a temporary transfer of ownership of a path from a caller to a callee. They happen only during subprogram call statements. A parameter is said to be borrowed when it is a name of mode in-out or out, 9 or of mode in and of type access-to-variable. 10 The last condition allows sending pointers with mode in, and modifying their referenced value while preventing any modification to the pointer. Ada provides a modifier constant that forbids any modification to the referenced value, and can be used in order send pointers with mode in without granting the permission to write on those values.
Intuitively, borrows can be seen as moving the borrowed path (actual parameter) with an Access attribute to the formal parameter, and then moving back the formal parameter to the actual. However, given that mode in parameters are not necessarily names, this complicates handling the borrows of such parameters, the details being explained in section 3.2.
The formal definition of a borrowed expression is similar to move, except that we do not require the top level expression to be deep for modes in-out or out (which coincides well with enclosing the top-level expression in a Access attribute). Hence, an expression in a procedure call is said to be borrowed if:
• It is an in actual parameter of a procedure and is of type access-to-variable.
• It is an in-out or out actual parameter to a procedure.
• It is the prefix of an Access attribute of a borrowed expression.
• It is a deep type direct subexpression of a borrowed expression.
After gathering the borrowed paths, we check sequentially that they have RW permission (or at least W for out parameters), and then set any prefix or extension to NO for the whole duration of the call if it is of deep type, R if shallow (so that its value can be used in other arguments without being passed to the callee). At the end of the call, every borrowed path has its permission updated to RW, and as for assigns, we propagate this update to the prefixes of those paths.
In the callee, any borrowed formal parameter of a procedure with mode in or in-out has RW permission, as well as any of its extensions. Any borrowed formal parameter of a procedure with mode out has W permission, as well as any of its extensions. We also require that at the end of the subprogram, every borrowed parameter should have permission RW, so that they could be moved back to the caller.
Observing
Observing is the mechanism that creates read-only aliases for parameters of mode in to subprograms. Formally any deep actual parameter of mode in that is not of type access-to-variable is observed, as well as any deep subexpression of an observed expression.
After gathering the observed paths, we check sequentially that they have at least R permission and then set any prefix or extension to R for the whole duration of the call. At the end of the call, every observed path has its permission reverted to the one it had before the call.
In the callee, any observed formal parameter of a procedure, as well as any of its extensions, have R permission.
Control structures
The previously given rules describe the evolution of permissions at the level of one block of statements. They should be completed with others rules that describe the checks done at different control structures available in SPARK, namely loops and conditions (gotos and exceptions are not available in SPARK). We only include conditions in µSPARK and exclude loops.
For conditions, we apply our rules on each block independently, yielding to different environments, and then merge those by taking, for each path, the greatest lower bound of its permission in the different environments.
For loops, we require permissions to get only less restrictive at the end of the loop, when compared to the entry. This rule forbids moving the same variable to a different element of an array at each iteration.
Proofs of safety
The section that follows provides a proof of the previously given anti-aliasing rules for the µSPARK language. For this purpose, we first provide a formalization of the µSPARK language with a grammar and typing rules, then with an operational semantics, and finally a formalization of the previously given rules on which we provide a proof of non-aliasing.
Grammar and syntax
We remind that a µSPARK program consists of a single procedure file containing declarations and body. A declaration can either be a procedure, a record type definition or an uninitialized variable declaration. The body consists of a sequence of instructions, that can be assignment statements of existing or freshly allocated values, procedure calls or if statements from which the condition has been abstracted (non-deterministic choice).
Only integer and user-defined record types are available, as well as accesses to existing types. Note that there are no loops, nor expression operators, which make the language non Turing-complete.
The full details of the grammar are given in Appendix B.
Operational semantics

Memory trees
The operational semantics is based on a memory model that keeps some relational information about the path leading to the designated memory area. To each path, we associate a memory cell with its value. This leads to the concept of memory trees that are quite similar to permission trees with the exception that those trees are finite, given that the access nodes can point to null value. Hence, the memory environment Υ is a mapping from variable declarations to memory trees.
We decide not to represent the implementation of aggregate structures inside the memory, supposed to be compiler-dependent. Thus we keep in our memory trees only a mapping of fields to children subtrees, as if one memory cell is enough for a structure to point to all its children. Indeed, without loss of generality, we can always chose in µSPARK a word size big enough, so that each memory cell contains arbitrarily many pointers.
Each memory tree is defined in the following way:
Formally, memory cells are elements of an arbitrary infinite set. We use the word fresh to designate an oracle that gives a new element of the infinite set (seen as an allocation of a machine word). This construct can be easily generalized to allocate a whole tree representing a given type τ , which we call fresh(τ ). It takes a type τ as an input and allocates the required memory areas for the type τ using the fresh oracle, and initializes them with default value.
• fresh(integer) is equivalent to Integer(fresh).
• fresh(access τ ) is equivalent to Access(fresh, N ull).
• fresh(R) is equivalent to Record(fresh, ∀x : τ ∈ R x → fresh(τ )). The assignment of one subtree to a node is peculiar. Indeed, as in real Ada/SPARK, the left-hand side does not get its memory address changed, only its value. In our representation of the memory this would look like a (deep) replacement of every value in Integer nodes, as well as a replacement of the subtree pointed by every Access node.
Assign
This
• Assign(Integer(C, ), Integer( , V )) = Integer(C, V )
• Assign(Access(C, ), Access( , P )) = Access(C, P )
For assignments, we copy the value of the left-hand side to the right-hand side. In terms of semantics, this is done by copying the value of each field, except for pointers where we copy the whole subtree in the indirection, as shown in Figure 4. 
Procedure calls
Another peculiarity happens at procedure calls, where we have to copy the actual parameter into a fresh tree representing the formal parameter (GetFromExpr, see below), run the semantics on the procedure definition (yielding Υ ), and then, depending on mode, copy back its content to the actual parameter. This semantics follows the compiled code, which pushes the parameters in the stack before call, jumps to the callee, and then pops them while moving them to the appropriate registers if those parameters are of mode out or in-out. This can be summarized by the rule (E-call), whose definition can be found in section 3.2.5.
The formal definition of GetFromExpr Υ (e) is:
• GetFromExpr Υ (null) = Access(f resh, N ull)
We also use SetF romExpr Υ (e i , x i ) for updating borrowed parameters with mode in (access-to-variable, note that mode in actual parameters are not solely names, hence the expression needs to be decomposed):
• SetF romExpr Υ (null, x i ): no update
• SetF romExpr Υ (n'Access, x i ) = Assign(n, Υ(x i .all)) (valid since formal parameters of mode in cannot be set to null in callee).
Semantics for statements
Every rule is in the form Υ.c = ⇒ Υ , where c designates any construct of the language. We annotate each semantics rule with s (statements) or d (declarations) for readability purposes.
.e a with mode in, e a+1 ...e b with mode in-out, e b+1 ...e n with mode out,
3.2.6 Semantics for declarations
Permission rules
Similarly, the rules defined in section 2.1 are mathematically formalized, with semantic-like rules that show the evolution of permission trees (defined in section 2.1.2) depending on lexical elements of the language and the mechanism used (borrowed, observed, moved). As for the semantics, we define some constructs to "allocate" 11 (Pfresh), normalize (PermRelease), merge (Fusion) permission trees.
As an example, the same assignment shown in Figure 4 would give the following sequence using the rule (P-assignDeepName) (all of them can be found in Appendix E). The whole derivation tree is presented hereafter, for better readability.
The rule (P-assignDeepName) applied to the assignment My Var.all := My Struct checks first that My Var.all is indeed a well defined deep variable, and that My Struct is a indeed a name. The permission corresponding to the node My Struct is checked to be Read-Write (using the notation Φ(My Struct)). Then, we apply the rule (P-M-ident) on the moved name My Struct that modifies its permission to write-only. The next part of the (P-assignDeepName) rule changes the permission of every extension of the moved name by putting its strict deep extensions with more indirections to NO permission (My Struct.b.all), strict deep extensions with same number of indirections of write-only (My Struct.b), and the strict shallow extensions to read-write (My Struct.a, My Struct.c). 12 Only after those changes, we check for write permission to the assigned name (My Var.all). This order is very important so as to check the safety of assignments of variables to themselves and prevent creating cycles in data-structures (such as assigning Tree.left.all := Tree). Finally, we change the permissions of the assigned path to read-write, as well as every extension, and propagate this update to its prefixes with the PermRelease operator that normalizes the permission tree. As for the operational semantics, the rule for procedure calls is also special. Depending on each argument mode, we apply a different rule (either Observe, BorrowIntOut or BorrowOut; the last differs from the previous by accepting write-only permission to the borrowed actual parameter). Then for every out or in-out parameter, they are set to read-write as well as all their extensions, as for assignment. Note that all the changes in permissions during call last only for the duration of the call.
procedure P (x 1 : τ 1 , ... , x n : τ n ) with x 1 ...x a observed, x a+1 ...x b borrowed with mode in, x b+1 ...x c borrowed with mode in-out, x c+1 ...x n borrowed with mode out,
Φ. P (e 1 , ... , e n ) − → s Φ (P-call)
Correctness of permission rules with respect to the operational semantics
The anti-aliasing requirement enforces CREW. This means that if an aliased memory node can be written (by assigning its associated path, or any prefix with the same number of indirections), then any other aliased node can be neither written nor read using another path.
The way we built our memory representation adds to each memory cell the path used to access it, thanks to the tree representation. This allows tracking aliasing very precisely, which is by definition the fact of accessing the same memory cell using two different paths. This gives a straightforward formalization of the main theorem.
Theorem 1. (No-aliasing).
For every set of nodes S in memory environment Υ such that their memory cells have the same address, consider their associated paths. If there is one path that can be written using the permission environment Φ, then all other paths in S can neither be written nor read.
Lemmas
Some lemmas are required, so as to prove that an associated path to a memory node always exists. The solution for this is to compare memory and permission trees, and find out that memory trees are a subset of permission trees. This is the coherence lemma, whose formalization is given hereafter.
There are other lemmas, used in the proofs, such as the fact that each permission rule leaves the environment normalized (Normalization lemma), that if a node has permission read, then all its children nodes also have read permission (Readability lemma), and that the memory cannot loop on itself (No-cycle lemma).
Lemma 1. (Normalization). Permission environment is normalized.
Proof. Straightforward. Every rule of the semantics calls the normalization operator PermRelease. The rules that do not call it are (P-block) (trivial case), and declaration rules (they create only new trees with one node).
Lemma 2. (Coherence).
For every node n in the memory environment, it is possible to find an associated node n in the permission environment, such that n and n designate the same path.
Proof. Every permission rule manipulates permission trees that have the same constructs as memory trees, except for access types that cannot be null. Hence every memory tree can be obtained from a permission tree by cutting nodes at access nodes when the pointer has null value.
Lemma 3. (Readability).
If a node has permission R (resp. RW), then all its children have permission R (resp. RW) at each step of the semantics.
Proof. By induction on the semantics:
1. (E-assignNull), (E-assignLiteral): Pfresh(τ, RW) guarantees it for the assigned path.
(E-assignName), (E-assignAccess), (E-assignNew):
same thing for the assigned path. For the moved path, every prefix gets its permission set to either W or NO by the (P-M-ident), (P-M-field), (P-M-deref) or (P-SM-ident), (P-SM-field), (P-SM-deref) rules. The extensions are handled by (P-assignDeepName), (P-assignShallowName), (P-assignAccess), and (P-assignNew).
(E-call):
we create such nodes by observing their paths. The rules (P-O-nullValue), (P-Olitteral), (P-O-takeAccess), (P-O-name) guarantee that if any node is set to permission R, then any extension of it is also set to R. After the callee returned, the proof is identical to assignments.
(E-block), (E-ifConditionTrue), (E-ifConditionFalse), (E-uninitDecl), (EprocedureDecl): trivial
Lemma 4. (No-cycle).
A node cannot have the same memory cell as any of its descendants (hence memory trees are finite).
(E-assignNull), (E-assignLiteral), (E-assignNew):
given that those rules only cut memory trees, there are no new indirections created.
(E-assignName)
: such a cycle could only be created when applying Assign on a node Access(C1, ) which is a descendant of the node being moved Access( , P ). In such a case, this would contradict hypothesis of the rule (P-assignDeepName), given that we set descendants of the moved node (ie strict extensions) to NO, before checking RW for the node to assign.
3. (E-assignAccess): such a cycle could only be created if the assigned Access node is a descendant of the subtree we are taking address of. In such a case, this would contradict hypothesis of the rule (P-assignAccess), given that we set descendants of the moved node (ie strict extensions) to NO, before checking RW for the node to assign.
(E-call):
borrows and observes do not modify addresses before transferring to callee. After returning, we assign every parameter. Hence identical as (E-assign) on each in-out or out parameter. For every in parameter, SetFromExpr is equivalent to either assigning n.all or n.
(E-block), (E-procedureDecl):
trivial by applying the induction hypothesis successively to each statement of the block.
(E-ifConditionTrue), (E-ifConditionFalse):
the F usion operator does not change memory places and pointers, only permissions.
(E-uninitDecl): every node is assigned to a new memory area (and pointers to null). Hence it is
impossible to point to an existing memory area.
No-aliasing proof Theorem 1. (No-aliasing).
The main theorem is proved by induction on the operational semantic. This leads us to consider each semantic rule one by one and show that the invariant holds. As an example, let us consider the proof for (E-assignName) and (E-call). The full proof is given in Appendix F.
(E-assignName) Let us take any set S in the environments Υ , Φ after executing one step of the semantics. Nodes can only get aliased between the first Access node descendant of assigned and moved node (because values are recursively copied, up to the first Access node encountered in which the pointer is copied, which creates an alias).
We can consider only the case when the moved or assigned path y is the one that can be written. Indeed, by Readability, y cannot be R in Φ. Hence it can only be NO, which leads to a contradiction. If y cannot be written nor read, then its permission is NO before executing the semantics. By normalization of Φ, we can say that the glb of its children is also NO (and recursively). Which contradicts RW permission for x.
Executing one step of the semantics creates an alias in x (the assigned path) for every node of any subtree rooted under an Access node that is a direct descendant of n. However, the rule (P-assignDeepName) says that when encountering an Access node, all the further descendants are set to NO, hence their paths cannot be written. The rules (P-M-ident), (P-M-field), (P-M-deref) guarantee also that any extension of n cannot be read anymore. This solves the case for elements of S that are descendant of x with different number of .all.
For elements of
Hence, the assigned path gets RW permission (as well as any extensions), but any aliased subtree of this node cannot be written nor read in the moved tree, hence only one aliased path be written, and all others can neither be written nor read.
(E-call) The case for procedure calls is particular: indeed we apply our inductive hypothesis after modifying environments, hence we have to guarantee that the invariants not only hold at the end of the rule, but also at the moment we transfer the control flow to the callee (ie for Υ in (P-call) and Φ in (PprocedureDecl)).
Let us consider such a set S in Υ (at the moment transferring to the callee). Suppose that one element of S can be written. Then the rule (P-procedureDecl) guarantee that this element is borrowed (it is a borrow of a subtree T of Υ). Hence the rules (P-B-name), (P-B-name-Out), (P-B-takeAccess), (P-B-nullValue), guarantee that the borrowed subtree has permission set to NO if deep, and R if shallow. Note that the borrowed subtree cannot have been observed, given that we borrow after observing, hence we require RW permission on an argument that has been set to R by observation. Thus, it is impossible for T to be observed, hence creating another element of S that could be readable. For the same reason, the hypothesis of the rules (P-B-entryPointInOut) and (P-B-entryPointOut) guarantee that the argument cannot be borrowed twice. Hence if one path can be written, all others cannot be neither written nor read.
Implementation and results
Laziness of permission trees
The implementation of the permission rules is done in Ada. They are implemented as a separate module of the GNAT Pro compiler (more precisely in the front-end) and the analysis procedure is invoked from SPARK analyzer when called with the special flag -gnatdF.
The implementation is 6200 lines long. It involves dynamically allocated tree data structures that are used to implement the permission trees. However, given that those trees may be infinite, we decided to proceed with a lazy implementation of permission trees, with a special dethunking method. Indeed, the maximum depth at which those permission trees are used is the maximum number of lexemes of a path, which is always finite, and in practice less than 7. Moreover, the AST does not allow easy iteration on extensions of paths, hence those trees have to be built on the fly, leaving undefined many parameters.
The definition of permission trees is hence modified to accept arrays, as well as fields to records that may not be referenced by the original definition, but may be added by object oriented programming (class-wide or incomplete types). Note that the T hunk node may represent both a leaf and an unevaluated internal node.
P ::= T hunk(P ermission, Is N ode Deep, Children P ermission) | Record(P ermission, Is N ode Deep, F ields → P, P ) | Access(P ermission, Is N ode Deep, P ) | Array(P ermission, Is N ode Deep, P )
This creates some approximations in our implementation, specially when setting the permissions to every extension in our permission rules, given that it is not possible to iterate over extensions. The exact implementation dethunks the tree depending on the type of the node, except for class-wide or incomplete types, that are replaced by an over-approximation. Similarly, when the permission changes for the whole subtree (such as assigning to a node), then the subtree is deallocated and replaced by a T hunk node. The rules presented in this report only address a subset of SPARK. However, during the internship, the rules as well as the implementation target the complete SPARK added with access types. Complete SPARK differs from µSPARK on several points.
Complete SPARK
As evoked before, SPARK has arrays. We apply our permission rule to all elements, without taking into account the exact index of that element. That means when assigning to an element of an array, there are no effects in terms of permissions, given that it is not known which element has been assigned. In section 4.4, we present a method to have an iterator over an array of pointers.
Besides procedures, SPARK has functions, that can return values and whose calls are expressions (instead of statements for procedures). Note that functions in SPARK can only have parameters of mode in and cannot have side effects. To handle them safely, we add the rule that every formal parameter has read-only permission (observing). Moreover, the expression returned is considered to be moved. This constructs allows constructors (destructors being procedures), but not accessors. 13 Types for which passing to procedure as parameter can cause aliasing problems are not the same as the ones that can cause aliasing problems when being assigned. Actually deep types only designate the latter, the former being already defined in Ada as not-by copy types (see Figure 6 ). Indeed, parameters to procedure are passed by-copy when they are shallow and can fit in a standard machine register. Other parameters may be passed by reference if shallow (compiler dependent) or are passed by reference if deep. Hence, the rules for complete SPARK replace deep by not by-copy in observes and borrows, while deep is kept for moves.
Many features from OOP have been ignored in this report, such as class-wide types. Some approximations are done to keep the safety of the analysis. We consider all class-wide types to be deep, by just ignoring their content, and considering them as always aliasing types.
Loops in Ada can be either finite or infinite. Exit statements allow exiting any enclosing loop. Thus, we require that the permission of each path at the exit point of a loop (exit statement or end of finite loop), has to be less restrictive than at entry. This is enforced by an hashtable that associates each loop id to two permission environments, the one at entry and an accumulator that merges every environment at each exit point of the loop.
Global variables are considered as implicit parameters to the most enclosing procedure, all the more since SPARK requires specifying the mode of each used global in a procedure. Thus, they obey to the same rules as formal parameters and actual parameters. When calling a procedure, the caller has to ensure that every global variable used in the procedure has adequate permissions with respect to specified mode.
Packages in Ada can have elaboration code that is executed when being loaded from outside. Any initialized global declaration in Ada is implicitly rewritten as initialization code. This feature is very useful for interacting with hardware that needs to be initialized before any call to the library. In our analysis, we treat this code as a procedure that has as out parameter every stateful global variable of the package.
Test suites
The analysis has first been tested on two test suites. The first, called fixedbugs, contains 17041 tests for all bugs fixed and features added in GNAT Pro compiler. The second is called acats-4 (Ada Conformity Assessment Test Suite), 14 and has 3905 standardized tests that every Ada compiler must pass. Those test suites must be passed in order to show that the new features implemented in the front-end do not break the existing compiler architecture. However, given that they do not contain any SPARK code, they do not allow assessing the efficiency of our rules on existing code base.
The most interesting test suite is spark2014, specific to SPARK. This suite has 2087 tests with valid SPARK code, and our analysis has only 30 regressions, almost all of them being caused by class-wide global variables that are manipulated with finer graining than the analysis is able to handle.
Finally, a small test suite written by the author has been used to check that the different constructs act accordingly to the anti-aliasing rules. These tests are inspired by the examples given in Rust borrow-checker README file. 15 
Some use cases
Swap
The first example is the swap procedure, whose naive implementation gets accepted by our rules. Note that there is no way of implementing a swap function in Rust. In Ada, we take advantage of in-out mode, that guarantees that after the procedure call, the in-out actual parameter to be assigned is exactly at the same address than the one being sent to the callee. 
Iterator
The second example shows how to have a mutable iterator over an array of pointers using the previously defined swap procedure. The procedure guarantees RW permission for both its arguments. Note that it is also possible to use renaming declarations for this case, but only the swap method could iterate pairwise over an array (bubble sorting, ...). 
Dynamic data structures
The last example shows some pieces of a code that manipulates trees with their child-sibling representation [7] . The code has a procedure Free Node that deallocates recursively a whole tree, and some statements that allocate a tree shown by Figure 7 . Then some procedure is called with two nodes passed as borrowed parameters with mode in-out, before the whole tree is freed. 
Comparison with Rust
The following section compares Rust and SPARK on some constructs that seem relevant to the author. We study what features the anti-aliasing allows and what constructs can be done using these rules. The main difference comes from the fact that SPARK uses provers to handle a lot of safety features, that are handled directly by Rust's borrow-checker.
Features
SPARK Rust No-aliasing Lifetime check
Specific checks
Automatic reclamation
Pools
Initialization checking
Flow
Nullity checking
By proof
Simple semantics [14] No user annotation Indeed, Rust's borrow-checker checks lifetimes (so that a local deep variable cannot be assigned to a global one), whereas this check is implemented as a separate analysis of GNAT compiler, with some more restrictive rules than Rust.
Automatic reclamation is handled by Rust's borrowchecker (using a static garbage collector), whereas Ada has a separate feature, called pools, acting like virtual stacks with a scope. Every variable allocated in this pool gets freed when the pool is destroyed (and lifetime checks prevent aliasing between two pools of different scopes).
Initialization checks are similarly done by Rust's borrow-checker in a safe way, whereas our rules only catch some uninitialized variable usage, with SPARK flow analysis doing the safe and very fine-grained analysis.
Nullity-checking is also a built-in feature of Rust (there a no safe null pointers in Rust), whereas we allow them, considering dereferencing a null pointer should be considered as a runtime error (like division by 0), and should be checked by SPARK static analysis tool-suite at silver level (AoRTE proof) [3] . 16 Finally, we should note that our analysis does not require any additional user annotation to the source 16 The joint Thales-AdaCore guideline defines fives levels of software assurance for SPARK software. The first is stone, that consists of valid SPARK code. The second is bronze, SPARK code that passed the initialization check and has a correctly specified data-flow. The third is silver, that adds the proof of AoRTE. The fourth is gold, in which key integrity properties are proven, such as pre and post conditions, type predicates, loop invariants. The fifth requires full functional proof of requirements, with a program fully specified. More details can be found on the following blog post http://www.spark-2014.org/entries/detail/verifythis-challenge-in-spark code (whereas Rust needs sometimes explicit lifetimes to be specified), and the rules are unambiguously defined whereas for Rust no official document specifies the borrow-checker (the README provided is quite incomplete). Second comparison is on what could be defined as expressiveness of the analysis, that means which constructs can be implemented on this analysis. Although we did not formalize this concept (and did not prove for Rust that some constructs could not be implemented), we consider that a little review of some constructs can be useful.
Features
We previously showed that cycling constructs could not be implemented in SPARK (No-cycle lemma). Rust has a similar limitation and requires some work-around to implement structures like graphs (like manually handling indexes). 17 We also saw that swap primitive is available in SPARK whereas it requires unsafe code in Rust, and the in-out mode allows assigning the exact same path as the one borrowed. In Rust, this feature is available for only one path by moving the argument to the callee, and moving back from the callee the argument as return value of the function.
Similarly, our intra-procedural analysis has the best approximation possible on aliasing (except for object oriented programming), using the lattice of permissions previously defined that allows tracking the exact path that gets aliased. Rust has a mechanism of restrictions against assignment, mutable borrow, or readonly borrow, which would correspond respectively to R/NO, R/W/NO, or W/NO. For instance, in Rust, when moving a variable, every prefix and extension gets restricted indiscriminately, whereas in SPARK, only paths that access to the aliased data are restricted on their reading or writing permission accordingly.
Another interesting design choice we made, is to ban borrows or observes inside a block, whereas Rust allows it. Indeed, we do not see use cases for which we need to create several read-only copies of a same deep variable in the body of a subprogram, all the more since this feature would require some new lexical constructs (like keywords or symbols), that cannot be added easily in Ada. Moreover, Ada has a mechanism, called renaming, that is used to shorten long paths, hence also rendering useless read-write borrows of a path.
Conclusion
In this report, we have presented anti-aliasing rules that allow adding pointers to SPARK, a subset of Ada used for static analysis with deductive verification. We showed a systematic analysis that allows a wide range use cases of pointers and dynamic allocation, as showed by the experiments. To the best of our knowledge, this is a novel approach for controlling aliasing introduced by arbitrary pointers in a programming language supported by proof. Our approach does not require user annotations or proof of verification conditions, which makes it much simpler to adopt. Moreover, we provided a mathematical proof of the safety of our analysis, and compared our method to another language providing such analysis, Rust.
Yet, still some work needs to be done to start using this analysis in commercial applications. Indeed, some constructs of SPARK (specially object orientation) are still not handled efficiently by the rules, and the back-end still does not implement proofs with pointers, which hopefully will be solved during year 2018. Similarly, some Ada libraries have to be changed in order to get them accepted by SPARK (drivers and containers), even though those fixes can be done without major refactoring. We could hopefully expect that future contributors to these anti-aliasing rules will tackle those problems.
Another long term goal would be extending the analysis so that it could handle different features (like Rust), such as automatic reclamation, parallelism, initialization and lifetime checks, which will simplify the existing mechanisms in the GNAT compiler.
